Agents and Devices: A Relative Definition of Agency by Orseau, Laurent et al.
Agents and Devices: A Relative Definition of Agency
Laurent Orseau1, Simon McGregor McGill2, Shane Legg1
1 DeepMind, UK
2 University of Sussex, UK
Abstract
According to Dennett, the same system may be de-
scribed using a ‘physical’ (mechanical) explanatory
stance, or using an ‘intentional’ (belief- and goal-
based) explanatory stance. Humans tend to find the
physical stance more helpful for certain systems,
such as planets orbiting a star, and the intentional
stance for others, such as living animals. We de-
fine a formal counterpart of physical and intentional
stances within computational theory: a description
of a system as either a device, or an agent, with the
key difference being that ‘devices’ are directly de-
scribed in terms of an input-output mapping, while
‘agents’ are described in terms of the function they
optimise. Bayes’ rule can then be applied to calcu-
late the subjective probability of a system being a
device or an agent, based only on its behaviour. We
illustrate this using the trajectories of an object in a
toy grid-world domain.
1 Introduction
Humans categorise physical systems into two important
classes: agents, and non-agents (which we here call ‘de-
vices’). Since both are mechanically described by physics,
what is the difference? Dennett has proposed that the distinc-
tion lies in how we subjectively explain these systems, and
identifies two ‘explanatory strategies’1: the physical stance,
which Dennett (2009) describes as “the standard laborious
method of the physical sciences, in which we use whatever
we know about the laws of physics and the physical consti-
tution of the things in question to devise our prediction”, and
the intentional stance, which he describes as “the strategy of
interpreting the behavior of an entity (person, animal, arti-
fact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a rational agent who
governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its
‘beliefs’ and ‘desires.”’
Baker et al. (2009) show that, by formalising agents as ra-
tional planners in an environment, it is possible to automat-
ically infer the intentions of a human agent from its actions
using inverse reinforcement learning (Russell, 1998; Ng and
Russell, 2000; Choi and Kim, 2015). However, this does not
1We ignore a third strategy, the design stance, in this article.
tell us whether to categorise a system as an agent or a device
in the first place; this question is observer-relative, since it de-
pends the observer’s prior knowledge (Chambon et al., 2011)
and how efficiently they can apply each explanatory stance.
Instead of modelling human cognition, we consider an ar-
tificial reasoner. We propose a formalization of these ideas
so as to compute, from the point of view of a mechanical
observer, the subjective probability that a given system is an
agent. To simplify matters, we assume a clearly identified
system that takes a sequence of inputs and returns a sequence
of outputs at discrete time steps.
First, we discuss a few informal examples in Section 2. We
give some notation and the formalism of the main idea in Sec-
tion 3. More details on devices and agents are given in Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2. We validate our proposal on a set of simple
experiments in Section 4, showing that some behaviours are
better described as devices rather than agents, and vice-versa,
using more specific algorithms tailored for this domain. We
also demonstrate how our model can explain how agents can
change their mind and switch goals—and still be considered
agents, as long as the switches are rare—thus implementing
the hypothesis of Baker et al. (2009).
2 Examples
We informally consider three examples from Dennett (2009):
a stone, a thermostat and a game-playing computer.
A stone follows a parabolic trajectory when falling. If we
interpret this as “wanting to reach the ground”, we need to
explain why the trajectory is parabolic rather than some other
shape; it is easier to predict the trajectory directly by using
Newtonian physics.
Dennett (2009) describes the thermostat as the simplest ar-
tifact that can sustain an intentional stance. The reason it is
on the knife edge is that it can be described either as a reac-
tive device (“if temperature is below the command, start heat-
ing”), or as an agent (“make sure the temperature is close to
the command”), using descriptions of comparable simplicity.
A system may strongly invite the intentional stance even if
it is entirely reactive. For example, the policy network in
AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2016) can play go at a high level,
even without using Monte-Carlo tree search. A mechanical
description would be fairly complex, consisting mostly of a
large list of apparently arbitrary weights, but it is very simple
to express the goal “it wants to win at the game of go”.
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3 Notation and formalism
At each time step t, the system under consideration receives
an input or observation xt ∈ X and returns an output or action
yt ∈ Y . We denote history pair (xt, yt) by yxt. These pro-
duce the sequences x1:t and y1:t of inputs and outputs from
step 1 to t included, and we call the sequence yx1:t an in-
teraction history or trajectory. We will also use the nota-
tion x<t ≡ x1:t−1, and similarly for y and yx. The sets X
and Y are considered finite for simplicity. The probability
simplex over a set S is denoted ∆S, i.e., if w ∈ ∆S, then
∀i ∈ [1..|S|] : wi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑|S|
i=1 wi = 1. The indicator
function [[test]] ∈ 0, 1 has value 1 if test is true, 0 otherwise.
In order to output a probability that a system is an agent, we
must give probabilistic definitions of both devices and agents
and then apply Bayes theorem to inverse the likelihood of an
observed trajectory to posterior probabilities of both views
of the system. We take a Bayesian point of view: a system
belongs to a set of possible systems, so we build a mixture of
all such systems for both agents and devices.
Describing devices: Mixture Md. Let Md be a set of
physical processes that can be described as a system, i.e.,
as an input-output device, that is, as some function d :
(X × Y)∗ → ∆Y that outputs a probability distribution to
outputs given an interaction history of inputs x<t and outputs
y<t. The set Md can be finite, countable, or uncountable,
but we consider it countable here. Then the likelihood of the
sequence of outputs for a given sequence of inputs to the sys-
tem, and supposing that the system is a device is
P (y<t|x<t,Md) =
∑
d∈Md
P (d)P (y<t|x<t, d),
that is, Md(y<t|x<t) :=
∑
d∈Md
wdd(y<t|x<t).
Md is thus a mixture of all these probability distribution func-
tions, where each such function d is assigned a prior weight
wd ∈ [0, 1] so that
∑
d∈Md wd = 1.
Among all device descriptions in Md, at step t the pos-
terior probability wd,t of a particular device description d is
found using Bayes rule in sequence: wd,t :=
wdd(y<t|x<t)
Md(y<t|x<t)
and the conditional probability of the next output can now be
written: Md(yt|y<t, x<t) =
∑
d∈Md wd,td(yt|y<t, x<t).
Describing agents: Mixture Mg . Similarly to devices, we
define a mixture over the setMg of all possible agents g ∈
Mg . We will describe how to define the mixture Mg and the
models for the agents in Section 3.2.
Putting it altogether: Mixture Ms. Now we can put both
descriptions together in a single mixtureMs. In effect, within
Ms we assume that any trajectory can be explained by either
the mixture of agents or the mixture of devices, and nothing
else. We take an uniform prior of the two mixtures:
Ms(y<t|x<t) := 12Md(y<t|x<t) + 12Mg(y<t|x<t).
Using Bayes’ rule, we can now compute the likelihood that
a sequence of outputs y<t is generated by an agent rather than
by a system. The (subjective) probability that the device is an
agent given a trajectory is the probability that the trajectory
is generated by an agent with the environment times the prior
probability of being an agent ( 12 ):
P (agt|y<t, x<t) = Mg(y<t|x<t)
Md(y<t|x<t) +Mg(y<t|x<t)
P (dev|y<t, x<t) = Md(y<t|x<t)
Md(y<t|x<t) +Mg(y<t|x<t) .
Furthermore, the posterior probability of a particular de-
vice d ∈ Md, i.e., how well this device can explain the tra-
jectory compared to other devices and agents, is
P (d|x<t, y<t) = P (Md|x<t, y<t)P (d|x<t, y<t,Md)
=
1
2Md(y<t|x<t)
Ms(y<t|x<t)
wdd(y<t|x<t)
Md(y<t|x<t) =
1
2wdd(y<t|x<t)
Ms(y<t|x<t)
and similarly for an agent g.
3.1 Devices
In principle, the device mixture Md can be any probabilistic
model that can be used to compute a likelihood of the output
history; A more Bayesian view is to consider the set of all
possible models (decision trees, neural networks, etc.) within
some class and assign some prior to them. In Section 4 we
use a mixture of simple contextual predictive models.
To produce a complete inference algorithm, we also con-
sider the choice of a universal prior measures over the set of
all computable devices.
Information theoretic choice: Algorithmic probability.
Ignoring computational limitations, an optimal choice for
the device mixture is to use (a straightforward variant of)
Solomonoff’s mixture (Solomonoff, 1964; Legg, 2008) for
some particular Turing-complete reference machine. If an ob-
served input-output trajectory can be described by any com-
putable function, Solomonoff’s inference will quickly learn
to predict correctly its behaviour. In the programming lan-
guage for our reference machine, all (semi-)computable de-
vices Mcompd can be expressed: Consider a program d that,
given a sequence of inputs x<t and outputs y<t, outputs
a probability distribution over the next observation yt ∈
Y . Each device d ∈ Mcompd is assigned a prior weight
wd := 2
−`d , where `d is the length in bits of the description
of the device on the reference machine. Md(y<t|x<t) :=∑
d∈Mcompd 2
−`dd(y<t|x<t). Hence, if there is a computable
device d∗ that correctly describes the system’s behaviour (i.e.,
if the system’s behaviour is computable), then Solomonoff’s
mixture prediction will be almost as good as d∗ since at all
steps t, Md(y<t|x<t) ≥ wd∗d∗(y<t|x<t) or in logarithmic-
loss or code redundancy terms ∀t : log 1Md(y<t|x<t) −
log 1d∗(y<t|x<t) ≤ log 1wd . Thanks to this very strong learn-
ing property, the subjective prior bias quickly vanishes with
evidence, that is, with the length of the trajectory.
A (somewhat) more computable choice. Under a
Solomonoff prior (which does not consider computation
time), the invariance theorem (Li and Vitanyi, 2008) says the
prior also contains an “interpreter” for all agents. The cost to
describe an agent as a device is then always bounded by the
cost of the interpreter. The speed prior (Schmidhuber, 2002;
Filan et al., 2016) is a computable variant of the Solomonoff
prior that takes into account the computation time required
to output the sequence y<t, hence greatly weakening the
invariance theorem.
A more observer-dependent prior could also be considered,
for example that depends on the computational limitations of
the observer and its background knowledge about the world.
3.2 Agents
To assess whether a given trajectory is agent-like, we apply
Bayesian inverse reinforcement learning (Ramachandran and
Amir, 2007; Choi and Kim, 2015) except that we want to out-
put a probability rather than a reward function.
Since the problem is inherently harder than “forward” RL,
most previous work in IRL focuses on MDPs. Here, since
the purpose of this paper is to provide a unified and gen-
eral framework, we propose a more general formulation using
Bayesian model-based and history based environments (Hut-
ter, 2005). The model of the environment may be imperfect
and allows for the agent to learn about it through interaction
(and update its beliefs with Bayes theorem). For agents, in-
puts are usually called observations and outputs actions.
After describing this general reinforcement learning frame-
work, we “invert” it to find the probability that an agent is
acting according to some reward function.
An environment µ : (Y × X )∗ → ∆X is a probability dis-
tribution over observations given the past observations and
actions, with µ(xt:T |y1:T , x<t) :=
∏T
k=t µ(xk|x<k, y1:k).
The environment can either be the known environment or an
uncertain environment, as in a mixture of potential environ-
ments, with their posteriors updated using Bayes theorem.
A utility function (or reward function) u : (Y × X )∗ →
[0, 1] assigns an instantaneous value to the current trajectory.
The cumulated utility of an interaction sequence is the sum of
the instantaneous utilities along that sequence.
A policy pi : (Y × X )∗ → ∆Y is a probability distribution
over actions given the past, i.e., pi(yt|yx<t) is how likely the
agent is to take action yt at time t. Similarly to environments,
we extend the definition of a policy: pi(yt:T |x<T , y<t) :=∏T
k=t pi(yk|y<k, x<k).
Now, given a particular utility function u, the value of a
given policy pi in an environment µ is given by:
Vµ,piu (yx<t, yt) := E
xt∼µ
[
u(yx1:t) + γ E
y′∼pi
Vµ,piu (yx1:t, y
′)
]
.
(1)
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. This last form also
allows us to consider the value of taking action yt after some
history yx<t, which is useful to define the policies. In par-
ticular, we may want the agent to follow the best policy pi∗u
that always chooses one of the actions of optimal value for a
given underlying utility function u in an environment µ:
Y∗t := arg max
y′
Vµ,pi
∗
u
u (yx<t, y
′)
pi∗u(yt|yx<t) :=
1
|Y∗t |
[[yt ∈ Y∗t ]].
But it is more realistic to consider that the agents are only
approximately rational. For simplicity in the remainder of
this paper we will consider -greedy policies instead, which
is still one of the favourite choices in RL research (e.g., Mnih
et al. (2015)). The policy of the -greedy agent chooses an
optimal action with probability 1− :
piu,(yt|yx<t) :=
(
(1− )
|Y∗t |
)[[yt∈Y∗t ]]( 
|Y \ Y∗t |
)[[yt /∈Y∗t ]]
. (2)
With  = 0, the agent always selects one of the best actions,
that is, it acts rationally.2
Inference. In an environment µ, given a utility function u
and an exploration parameter , we can compute the likeli-
hood of the sequence of actions y<t conditioned on the ob-
servations x<t simply with piu,(y<t|x<t).
Thanks to the nice form of Eq. (2), we can actually make a
mixture piu of all values for  in closed form:
piu(y1:T |x1:T ) :=
∫ 1
0
piu,(y1:T |x1:T )w d
=
∫ 1
0
T∏
k=1
(
(1− )
|Y∗t |
)[[yt∈Y∗t ]]( 
|Y \ Y∗t |
)[[yt /∈Y∗t ]]
w d
=
T∏
k=1
1
|Y∗t |[[yt∈Y∗t ]] |Y \ Y∗t |[[yt /∈Y∗t ]]
∫ 1
0
(1− )T+u T−u w d
where w is some prior over  and T+u := |{t ∈ [1..T ] : yt ∈Y∗t }| is the number of times a best action is chosen w.r.t. u,
and T−u := T − T+u . The integral is the definition of the Beta
function, and thus taking w := 1 we obtain:
piu(y1:T |x1:T ) = T∏
k=1
yk∈Y∗k
1
Y∗k

 T∏
k=1
yk /∈Y∗k
1
|Y| − |Y∗k |
 1T + 1
(
T
T+u
)−1
(3)
where
(
a
b
)
is the binomial coefficient a!b!(a−b)! .
Finally, we can now build the mixture Mg over all goals:
Mg(y1:T |x1:T ) :=
∑
u∈U
wupiu(y1:T |x1:T ). (4)
A simple choice for the weightswu iswu := 1|U| if U is finite.
Universal IRL. Similarly to devices in Section 3.1, we can
also use Solomonoff’s prior over the set of reward functions,
which would lead to “inverting” AIXI, where AIXI is the op-
timal Bayesian RL agent for the class of all computable envi-
ronments and reward functions (Hutter, 2005).
2This definition slightly departs from the standard one (1 −
) 1|Y∗t |
[[yt ∈ Y∗t ]] +  1|Y| in order to allow for integrating over .
Table 1: An example of a device that moves along the walls.
Cell in front of the system
wall empty red green blue magenta
Last act
↑ ← ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
↓ → ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
← ↓ ← ← ← ← ←
→ ↑ → → → → →
With the speed prior for devices. In the case we use the
speed prior for the devices, one problem arises: Since the
agent can use the Bellman equation for free, if any device can
be represented as an agent then everything may look like an
agent because the penalty for devices is too large. To com-
pensate for this, we take away something from agents, for
example we can set he prior to 2−2`(u) instead of 2−`(u).
4 Experiments
To test our hypothesis, we built a gridworld simulator (see for
example Fig. 2). The system under consideration (the yellow
triangle) can move in the 4 directions (up, down, left, right)
except if there is a wall. The red, green, blue and magenta
balloons have fixed positions. Does the system act rationally
according to one of the goals, or is its behaviour better de-
scribed as a moving device that simply reacts to its environ-
ment? The experimenter can make the triangle follow a se-
quence of actions y1:T .
4.1 Device descriptions
For a device, we define the observation xt at step t to be the
kind of cell (wall, empty, red, green, blue, magenta) it is fac-
ing in the world, in the direction of its last action.
A device’s behaviour is defined by a set of associations be-
tween a context and an action, for all possible contexts; a con-
text is made of the current observation and the last action the
agent took. An example of a device’s deterministic function
can be found in Table 1. There are 424 ≈ 1014 different de-
terministic functions describing devices. As for agents below,
we allow for -deterministic devices, i.e., at each step there is
a probability of 1 −  that the device takes the agent given
by its deterministic function, and an  chance that it takes a
different action.
Each context is associated with a multinomial predictor.
Let A := |Y| be the number of actions. Let C be the set of
all mutually-exclusive contexts (only one context is active at
any step), and let CT be the set of contexts that have been
visited after the trajectory yx1:T . Let Tc,i be the number of
times action y = i has been taken in the context c, and let
Tc :=
∑A
i=1 Tc,i be the number of visits of the context c.
An -deterministic context model puts a categorical distribu-
tion over the set of actions for each context, where  is a C-
dimension vector of probability distributions over Y , hence
∀c,∑Ai=1 c,i = 1: µc,(y1:T |x1:T ) := ∏c∈C(c,i)Tc,i , which
in the current experiments are essentially a Markov model of
order 2. We can now build a continuous mixture of all such
-deterministic context models:
Md(y1:T |x1:T )
:=
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
A−1 times
∏
c∈C
µc,(y1:T |x1:T )p(c,2)dc,2 · · · p(c,A)dc,A
where c,1 = 1 −
∑A−1
i=1 c,i. Taking a uniform prior
p(c,i) := 1 over  leads to a multinomial estimator:
Md(y1:T |x1:T ) :=
∏
c∈C
(A− 1)!
∏A
i=1(Tc,i!)
(Tc +A− 1)! .
4.2 Agent descriptions
We consider a very small set of Ngoals := 4 goals, U :=
{ured, ugreen, ublue, umagenta} —the red, green, blue, and ma-
genta circles in Fig. 2.
To be able to assign a probability to the actions of the tra-
jectory, we first need to solve the Markov Decision Process
(MDP) (Sutton and Barto, 1998) for each goal, using states
instead of histories, where the state is simply a (row, column)
position in the environment. The value Vµ,piu in Eq. (1) is then
computed for each state-action, with a reward of 1 for reach-
ing the goal, and 0 everywhere else. The resulting mixture is
computed with Eqs. (3) and (4).
The switching prior
An interesting point made by Baker et al. (2009) is that peo-
ple often switch from one goal to another in the middle of
a trajectory. In order to take such behaviours into account,
we will also use Veness et al. (2012)’s switching prior tech-
nique (Volf and Willems, 1998)which is an efficient mixture
over all sequences of models (here, all possible sequences of
goals), that keeps a probability of 1t+1 of switching at time t
from the current goal to a different one—and thus has a prob-
ability of tt+1 of keeping the current goal.
Unfortunately, the switching prior does not seem to coop-
erate well with the integration over  in Eq. (3). Therefore,
instead of using Eq. (3), we use a mixture of a fixed num-
ber N := 50 of values for  ∈ { kN−1}k∈[0..N−1], which is
sufficient for the purposes of this demonstration.3
With P := {piu,}u∈U being the set of all policies:
Mg(y1:T |x1:T ) :=
N−1∑
=0
1
N
SwitchP(y1:T |x1:T ),
SwitchP(yt|x<t, y<t) :=
∑
pi∈P
wpi,tpi(yt|x<t, y<t),
wpi,t+1 :=
t
t+ 1
wpi,tpi(yt|x<t, y<t)
SwitchP(yt|x<t, y<t) +
wpi,1
t+ 1
3With 50 different values, the performance of the mixture may
start to degrade after a few hundreds steps, but the considered tra-
jectories in this demonstrator are usually shorter.
where the last line implements the switching update rule4
with wpi,1 := 1|P| . If no switching is necessary, the cost (in
the logarithmic loss) is bounded by log(t+1) at time t, which
is a rather small cost to pay.
Apart from the inversion of the MDP, the computation
time taken by the mixture for a sequence of length T
is O(NNgoalsT ), compared to O(NgoalsT ) for the non-
switching mixture of Eq. (4).
4.3 Some trajectories
Some sample trajectories and associated results are given
in Figs. 1 to 7.We report the negative log likelihood
(NLL) for both device and agent mixtures, remembering
that P (yx1:T |agent) = Mg(yx1:T ) where we use yx1:T as
an abbreviation of y1:T |x1:T . We also report the posteri-
ors P (M?|yx1:T ) of the device and agent mixtures M? ∈
{Md,Mg} in the global mixtures Ms along with their neg-
ative log values as the latter are usually more informative, as
they can be interpreted as complexities or relative losses. The
switching prior is used only for the trajectory of Fig. 5, as for
the other trajectories switching is similar to not switching.
Running in circles. (See Fig. 1.) This behaviour is a proto-
typical example of a system behaving more like a device than
like an agent: the behaviour is very simple to explain in terms
of instantaneous reactions without referring to some goal.
(a) Trajectory.
Device Agent
v1 18.01 37.48
v2 1.00 0.00
v3 0.00 19.40
v1 = − lnP (yx1:T |M?)
v2 = P (M?|yx1:T )
v3 = − lnP (M?|yx1:T )
(b) Posteriors of the device
and agent mixtures.
Figure 1: The system is running in circles for 25 steps.
Rational behaviour. (See Fig. 2.) This behaviour is
strongly described as that of an agent. Indeed, it appears that
it is going as fast as possible to the magenta balloon. A device
description is however still relatively simple, as witnessed by
the low relative complexity of the device mixture’s posterior.
Suboptimal trajectory toward the blue balloon. (See
Fig. 3.) The system attains the blue balloon after 66 steps,
whereas the fastest path requires only 36 steps. The system is
still considered as an agent because of the difficulty to attain
4This is a slight simplification over (Veness et al., 2012) for read-
ability that has a logarithmic loss of log(t + 1) + log |P| at each
switch instead of log(t+ 1) + log(|P| − 1).
(a) Trajectory.
Device Agent
v1 18.16 11.31
v2 0.00 1.00
v3 6.85 0.00
v1 = − lnP (yx1:T |M?)
v2 = P (M?|yx1:T )
v3 = − lnP (M?|yx1:T )
(b) Posteriors of the device
and agent mixtures.
Figure 2: The system goes straight to the magenta balloon.
the blue balloon, which compensates for the suboptimality of
the trajectory.
(a) Trajectory.
Device Agent
v1 83.53 72.04
v2 0.00 1.00
v3 11.49 0.00
v1 = − lnP (yx1:T |M?)
v2 = P (M?|yx1:T )
v3 = − lnP (M?|yx1:T )
(b) Posteriors of the device
and agent mixtures.
Figure 3: The system is going toward the blue balloon in a
suboptimal way.
Following walls. (See Fig. 4.) This is another example of a
behaviour that is typical of a reactive system that acts without
purposes. This trajectory seems to be more agent-like than
a random one or running in circles, and one may be tempted
to describe the behaviour of the system as “it wants to avoid
walls”. However, when described with a simple deterministic
reactive system without intentions (“when there is a wall in
front, turn right”), it seems to lose its agency aspect.
(a) Trajectory.
Device Agent
v1 26.09 43.33
v2 1.00 0.00
v3 0.00 17.24
v1 = − lnP (yx1:T |M?)
v2 = P (M?|yx1:T )
v3 = − lnP (M?|yx1:T )
(b) Posteriors of the device
and agent mixtures.
Figure 4: The system turns when facing a wall.
Switching goals. (See Fig. 5.) The system looks like it is
going first toward the magenta balloon, but before reaching
it switches to going to the green balloon. This time, for the
agent’s mixture we use the switching prior model described
in Section 4.2. We also report the log likelihood of the tra-
jectory for the non-switching model for information: without
the switching prior, the behaviour toward either the blue or
the green balloons is very suboptimal, and thus (without a
switching prior) it is easier to consider the trajectory as gen-
erated by a device rather than an agent. The posteriors of
each goal along the trajectory is shown in Fig. 6. Between
steps 3 and 19, the system seems to go to any other goal than
the magenta one, and this becomes clearer starting at step 10
when the system enters the corridor. However, the mixture
cannot yet tell which goal is more likely. Similarly, when go-
ing away from the blue balloon, the system is uncertain as to
which is the actual target now, and becomes certain it is the
green balloon only after the middle corridor’s entrance.
(a) Trajectory.
Switching Non-Switching
Device Agent Agent
v1 64.4851 30.3043 92.1446
v2 0.0000 1.0000 NA
v3 34.1808 0.0000 NA
(b) Posteriors of the device and agent mixtures.
Figure 5: Switching goals using a the switching agent model.
Figure 6: Sequence of the posteriors of the different goals for
the trajectory of Fig. 5 using a switching prior.
Random behaviour. (See Fig. 7.) A random behaviour is
difficult to explain both in terms of a device and in terms of
an agent, and thus leads to a high NLL in both cases: The
context hits (see Fig. 8) have high entropy, and the best value
for an -greedy agent policy is high too (around 0.6).
(a) Trajectory.
Device Agent
v1 141.64 144.11
v2 0.92 0.08
v3 0.08 2.55
v1 = − lnP (yx1:T |M?)
v2 = P (M?|yx1:T )
v3 = − lnP (M?|yx1:T )
(b) Posteriors of the device
and agent mixtures.
Figure 7: The system is choosing its action uniformly ran-
domly for 100 steps.
Context Action
in front,last action up down left right
empty,down 2 2 3 8
empty,left 4 5 2 5
empty,right 3 8 4 2
empty,up 5 5 4 2
wall,down 4 6 2 3
wall,left 2 2 2
wall,right 2 5 3
wall,up 4
Figure 8: Context hits for the random experiment (“-” = 0).
5 Conclusion
Every physical system can be described as either an agent
(which pursues goals) or a device (which responds mechan-
ically to its inputs). Hence we ask the question of subjec-
tively how much sense it makes to call the system an agent or
a device; we quantify the answer in the form of a posterior
probability. This subjective probability takes into account the
observer’s intrinsic biases and background knowledge.
We formalize the idea using inverse reinforcement learn-
ing techniques for agents (roughly, given a sequence of ac-
tions and observations, find the best goal and -greedy policy
for this goal), and sequence prediction techniques for devices
(roughly, find the best -deterministic policy that fits the ob-
served behaviour), and compare the two resulting likelihoods.
The approach was validated on a simple and clear test do-
main with a varied set of trajectories. While the purpose of
this work is to provide a mostly non-anthropocentric formal-
ization of a definition of agency, it would be informative to
investigate the extent to which it matches human judgements.
From a reinforcement learning perspective, the proposed
approach may also be useful to design environments that can
help maximize “agenthood”, that is, to build agents that can
thrive as agents rather than performing device-like tasks.
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